Jump to content

Legion Influences // Historical Military Doctrines


Kais Klip

Recommended Posts

Allllrighty. I had a few thoughts about a few different legions this evening. Will try and avoid Wall of Txt Syndrome [what can I say - I've got IVth on the brain ... we see something to be locked down, we build a wall on it]. 

First up, we have the Word Bearers. Now there are, obviously, any number of military forces over the millenia who have wholeheartedly embraced the idea of being Holy Warriors. It's a pretty potent and useful mechanism for building up/sustaining morale and Elan. And there's nothing like the righteous fervor of fighting an apostate-anathema for motivation. 

But there are very different 'styles' if you like of Holy Armies, and I'd contend that just lumping them all together actually hides some serious differences (which are going to be somewhat instructive when it comes to talking about the Legion's engagement style and ORBAT development). 

At their inception, we have the XVIIth acting in two or three roles. The first one of which is as something of a diplomatic corps - rolling up to the gates of an enemy settlement, issuing their ultimatims to cut it out with the religious practice and accept the Imperial Truth ... and then either dying after a protracted struggle against those not so keen to hear their message, or presumably assisting with the rebuilding of that society more along 'acceptable' Imperial lines. 

The point of analogy for this is, arguably, not so much 'religious warriors' as special operations forces, with a dash of prelate and Herald [hence their original name]. A Green Beret of the 'fanatical anti-communist' flavour dispatched off up into the highlands, perhaps, who winds up finding something overly "collectivist" in the tribe he's sent to contact and reacting accordingly. Followed up by a full-blown "Total War" destruction-force after he gets turned down. "Apres moi, le deluge", indeed. [this latter phase might put one in the mind of some of the activities of the SS on the Eastern Front...]

Perhaps pre-their-own heresy WOrd Bearers might be regarded as comparable to the Teutonic Knights - particularly around the time of the Prussian Crusade. There, we had a force of heavily armed and armoured men (men, it must be remembered, so considerably above the levies they also went into battle with) who took the fight to the heathens of the Baltic (who, at this time, were still nominally pagan) with the aim of evangelism. There are, of course, numerous other examples of 'holy warrior' or zealot troops (including hte literal Zealots/Sicarii) drawn from history and fiction (the mind instantly recalls a litany of Levantine and further East examples); but it's occasionally questionable as to how appropriate the operational comparisons are with Astartes warfare, as many (but not all) of these forces tend to operate as light infantry for a variety of reasons (the Mujahideen, for instance, or Hezbollah). Somebody's already mentioned ISIS - and perhaps there is an instructive parallel there, given the effort which ISIS has put upon capturing and destroying sites of archaeological significance [which is certainly what hte 'Iconoclasts' are around for]. [another obvious point of reference would be the Taliban - both in general, and via doing things like blowing up the Bamiyan Buddhas]

Anyway, things start to change rather severely when they make their transition over to the side of the Great Enemy (predictably) - not just due to their newfound predilection for DECIDEDLY asymmetric warfare (in the form of warpcraft, conjuring warpstorms, slicing their way through reality as a rapid-deployment method, and all the rest of it ... to say nothing of employing both daemons and daemon-possessed shock troops) ... but ALSO because we start to see their incorporation of un- or less-augmented human detachments (represented by the Imperialis Militia/Warp Cults list). 

The battlefield role for Warp Cults ranges from simple screening-troops and cannon-fodder (there's the lines in the relevant Black Book about Ultramarine forces having to expend waaaay too much of their ammunition gunning down cultists so that they're in a less-prepared position to deal with hteir twisted masters) through to strategic redirection and distraction (i.e. "we've got to deal with the ten thousand screaming cultists over *here* ... and hope like hell that the isolated strongpoint a few kilometers over *there* can hold out by itself because we just can't spare the troops"). I would also contend that it's quite likely for the cultists in questoin to be used for um ... well, to put it bluntly, like how Grotz are stated to be used by Ork forces. That is to say, mine-clearing (without being combat engineeers, if you get my drift) recon-in-strength (or, at least, numbers masquerading as strength), and all hte rest of it. Oh, and on top of this, the effect of engaging Warp Cults on the average Imperial Soldier or even Marine must have been seriously rattling. Youv'e got absolutely fanatical troops dying in droves who just /keep coming/. Walk straight through minefields in perfect order; and are probably mutated, covered in sigils that hurt the eeyes, and screaming or chanting the whole time. In other words, "shock troops" after a sort. 

Now, all of the above reminds me VERY STRONGLY of one modern force in particular. And despite what some might be thinking ... no, it ain't the Soviets.

Instead, it's the Basij Militia as employed during the Iran-Iraq War by the Iranians. Particularly due to the way it operated as a separate (and decidedly less competent/well-equipped) force to the conventional Iranian Army - esp. in the mmid phases of the conflict. (which is actually where things started to go seriously awry - as the forces stopped acting in co-ordination, at least partially due to political pressures, so the massed human wave attacks of the Basij which had been so successful in concert with conventional military (tanks, air attacks etc.) in the early war when driving the Iraqis out of Iran ... weren't nearly as useful once the fighting started taking place on the Iraqi soil in '83/'84 in hte absence of such support).

The particular incident which reallyd rove this home for me was reading about Operation Before The Dawn which was carried out in February of 1983 toward al-Amarah. There's probably an element of propaganda in reports and estimates that the literal /tens of thousands/ of casualties sustained by the Basij (who occasionally weren't even armed) were the result of Shi'ite drives toward martyrdom ... but the fact remains nominal zealots that attempting to clear a path through the defensive lines, obstacles and minefields of the Iraqis for better troops, armour and all the rest of it ... is pretty much exactly how I view the Word Bearers operating.

There's also other elements drawn from the Iran-Iraq war (on both sides) which resonate (at least somewhat) with Calth etc. - in particular, the Iraqis' decision to undertake crippling surprise attacks on Iranian staging points via both chemical and conventional weapons; as well as the subsequent War of the Cities (because really, attempting to obliterate major population centers as a morale-tool is pretty much one of the things that the betrayal at Calth was ... in addition, obviously, to helping to seriously mess up logistics and communication-lines via the Ruinstorm, and crippling Imperial forces in the area in a combination of surprise attack, bombardment, decisive battle, and tarpitting through the Underworld War).

Now as applies the Word Bearers themselves ... a few other points potentially spring to mind. 

The Gal Vorbak themselves remind me for some reason of the stories about North Korean troops during the Korean War being dosed up on methamphetamine or whatever, and then sent careening towards Allied/UN lines - with their limbs bound by thick ropes to both absorb somewhat bullet impacts, as well as to keep their limbs slightly together and functional in cases of broken bones from percussive impact shock. We can also draw a broader analogy between the general zealot disposition of the Word Bearers and their 'human' cohorts and the widespread use of amphetamines and other stimulant drugs in Middle Eastern conflicts such as the one presently raging in Syria. [i personally think that a lot of the attrocity level stuff happening in particular wars has quite a lot to do with whether the troops in question are on these sorts of drugs - c.f the SS and Pervitin - but that's a bit of a digression. Certainly provides a bit of a template for force-behavior -the comparison between being jacked up on meth versus jacked up on warp-dust]

The use of propaganda-warfare by ISIS is also something resonant with the WOrd Bearers' way of war. As we can see a pretty direct parallel between execution videos and all hte rest of it with the XVIIth's flooding of comms relays with pretty messy sounding stuff [particularly because one of the impicitly desired effects of both of htese things is as a recruitment tool - although an Imperial trooper whose mind breaks upon seeing a chaotic sigil appear on a vidscreen may be a bit of a different kettle of fish from somebody who flies cross-continents to join up with ISIS]. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Another excellent write up, Ryltar. My thanks for your links. I particularly like how you approached a slightly tangential legion when it comes to strategy. Daemons we know yes, militia also, but what we haven't seen is exactly how the word bearers operate before or after all the summoning. It's what was never explained for them in the second black book, or even the Calth one. Maybe I'm just looking at something that just isn't there. Maybe Alan just wants to write "Just like any other Space Marine, just extra righteous-like." Is that it? 

 

I was also dissapointed in that the Calth book, being dedicated to only the two legions, really didn't go into the detail of how the Word Bearers used their summoning, strategically speaking, in an attempt to mitigate the Ultramarine's superior (?) conventional tactics. I do really hope that Alan and the team really go head first into this for the Thramas book. 

 

While we're at it, I'm still trying to understand the difference between the Ultramarines copying say, a maneuver from the Iron Hands, and how the Emperor's children imitate it.  

 

A tangential point, but its been bothering me. How does the mentality of Iron Warriors, Death Guard, Salamanders and Word Bearer's diverge? Can you put it in a way that justifies only two of them getting morale re-rolls in the game? And while we're at it, can anyone explain how an Iron Warrior can ignore shooting casualties, but baulk at close combat just like any other wimp legion? A mentality write up would be welcome, but I am also looking for a few witty one liners to remember regarding the topic. 

 

Edit: This line: "Particularly due to the way it operated as a separate (and decidedly less competent/well-equipped) force to the conventional Iranian Army." 

 

This is exactly what I'm looking for actually; just what does a force like Basij (our analogy to Word Bearers), have to do to beat a conventionally tactically/strategically superior force like the Iranian Army? Or is it really as simple as "tactics beat zealots, son." I must note that this force would not use guerrilla warfare, as that would be going too close to Vietnam and the privy of other legions. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The next Legion I had a few thoughts on was the Alpha Legion. Now, pretty much everybody implicitly knows what they're supposed to be about - and have at least a vague conception of them as "special forces" - or, as has been suggested by some commentators here, "Green Berets", "CIA" and "Shin Bet".

It's not that I disagree with these classifications. Indeed, quite the opposite. But I do think they could use some fleshing out with regard to actual historical praxis. And I think i've found *just* the force/figures to do it.

Enter Iran's Quds Force. And, in specia, the chap commanding them - Major General Qasem Soleimani. [ who has been described as something of an intelligence agent's ghost story] The former reason for their existence was something along hte lines of 'exporting the Revolution'; which later on morphed somewhat into acting as a combination paramilitary/special forces/intelligence/diplomatic/black ops organization dedicated to often decidedly unorthodox Iranian power projection. This became increasingly necessary in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war, which fairly convincingly suggested to the Iranians that conventional approaches - diplomacy and force of arms - weren't going to be particularly viable in advancing their geopolitical agenda.

If we look at their operational style, the Quds Force appears to do everything from building and co-ordinating with local forces in both advisory and command roles (for example, Shi'ite militias in Iraq, and the Syrian Army in Syria - they've also a very good longstanding relationship with Hezbollah), through to direct actions themselves in a battlefield context. However, they also occasionally get up to hijinks like attempting to hire a Mexican drug cartel to carry out a targeted assassination in Washington of the Saudi ambassador to the US (which, while it might sound pretty Alpha Legion ... loses XXth points because the guy they reached out to turned out to be a DEA plant, which is where the whole operation came unstuck tongue.png ), and other such acts of nefarious arguable terrorism. More interestingly, though, they (or, rather, Soleimani) also appear to act as a bit of a diplomatic corps - with Soleimani allegedly playing a critical role in bringing the Russians on-board with the idea of intervening in the Syrian civil war [the account linked has Putin personally requesting Soleimani's involvement]; and even apparently securing the American withdrawal from Iraq that accompanied the formation of the Maliki government (which, obviously, made Iraq into that much more of an Iranian playground - a strategic aim achieved via political manipulation which oculd not have been done via bullets). There's also reports of Iranian diplomats directly taking orders from Soleimani [including a substantial period in 2001 wherien Soleimani appears to have been closely co-operating with the Americans in Afghanistan]; and of the Quds Force flooding particular warzones (whether late-2000s Iraq and Afghanistan, or present-day Yemen) with occasionally rather advanced weapons (such as the somewhat armour-piercing, motion-sensor triggered EFP bombs].

Now as applies the Alpha Legion, the foundations for a rather close comparison ought appear immediately and strikingly obvious. Instead of fighting conventionally, these guys engage in just about everything but - whilst still retaining the capacity to conventionally engage if necessary. Assassinations and working through local catspaws are one thing; but what really swayed me was the perspective that what these guys have effectively managed to do over the thirty or so years of their existence ... is build up an impressive Iranian sphere of influence stretching from eastern Afghanistan through to the Mediterranean in both Lebanon and Syria in ways that conventional military action by Iran would simply have been unable to (which puts Quds on a different level, arguably, to Mossad or whatever - because whilst Mossad's record of foreign operations is undeniably impressive, I don't think they've *quite* pulled off pulling together a reasonable swathe of an entire region of the globe under regional power suzerainty). This is not to say that large-scale interventions haven't taken place - of course htey have. But it's all the more impressive (in my book, anyway) when you manage to rope in Russia and a whole boatload of other forces to do your work for you.

Now THAT'S Alpha Legion!

On top of this, I did also consider elements in what's tenuously identified as the "Arabian way of war" as being fairly emblematic of the Alpha Legion. This account by a retired US Colonel with experience in the region highlights tendencies towards "evasion, delay and indirection [...] winning wars without battles". There's also some interesting remarks toward the end about a culture of outright falsehood when it comes to dealing with allies as part of a strategy of manipulation [for example, Sadat is supposed to have had an /entire secondary set of operational plans/ drawn up so as to fool the Syrians into doing what Egypt wanted against Israel in '73].

As an example of Egyptian strategic misdirection bearing fruit, the pre-engagement phases of Operation Badr spring to mind [the crossing of the Suez Canal which opened the Yom Kippur War]. Probably not nearly as sneaky as most sorts of things tha the XXth get up to (as the Israelis still effectively wound up with six hours' warning of the impending invastion), but still importantly effective (Israeli defensive plans were predicated upon having 48 hours' warning; and had it not been for the serious strength of misdirection and obfuscation employed by the Egyptians, would almost certainly have noticed and responded to the rather substantial troop-buildup taking place on their then-border - making the crossing of the Suez an unquestionable bloodbath).

Rounding out the profile for the Alpha Legion (because while there are many other potential examples to draw upon ... it's a quarter past five in the morning, and I'm trying to avoid excessive text-walling beyond what i've done already tongue.png ) is probably Otto Skorzeny. In specia, not just his incredibly daring commando antics (including his Post-War activities as a sort of a Mossad agent - which hinged around his German targets presuming he was still .. well .. German-aligned rather than working for the people the Nazis hated most), but his role in Operation Greif as part of the Battle of the Bulge. Here, the unit he formed - Panzer Brigade 150 - made a point of having forces capable of speaking English, wearing American uniforms, and visually disguising German armoured vehicles as their rough Allied equivalents; with the goal of using the ensuing confusion and misdirection to seize two important bridges. This recalls rather strongly the Alpha Legion practice of repainting hteir armour or otherwise disguising themselves as other Legion forces. [which reaches some heights of ridicularity with the "I AM ALPHARIUS" ascended-meme ... and gets more than a little confusing during one of the Alpha Legion novels, in which Iron Hands disguised as Alpha Legion wind up engaged against Alpha Legion disguised as Iron Hands disguised as Alpha Legion or something]. [the "I am Alpharius" practice, apart from its obvious point of inspiration with "I am Spartacus", has quite some 20th century precedent to it as well]

Oh, and something I keep meaning to do is look into the historical precedents for the character of Mendacs in Liar's Due. Because again - THAT'S how the Alpha Legion wage war in my head. Not so much through Serpent Beneath style over-elaborate heist movie double-blind infiltrations [which are the bits we customarily see the most of]... but also by looking at the overarching strategic picture, and deploying the least effort possible (in this case, a single operative) to take an entire string of worlds in succession. I'm also a great fan of the implication from the third Black Book that Paramar V was taken for the express purpose of tying down the Warmaster's forces and thus subtly tilting the balance of the galactic conflict against the rebels for a bit; and would be mad interested in finding a real-world equivalency for this.

Anyway, I've once again gone wildly over-length ... but hopefully that's fleshed out some historical points of reference/inspiration for how the Alpha Legion might act. I can't stress enough how much I perceive the actual table-top engagements of the Alpha Legion to be an extreme minority of XXth Legion warfare - the "tip of the iceberg", if you will. Much of the time that the Emperor's forces wind up fighting the Alpha Legion, they probably don't have any idea that they're actually fighting the Alphas - either because the forces they're engaging are Legion catspaws, unwitting pawns [c.f the Orks against hte White Scars in the early scene from The Serpent Beneath], or disguised. And that many of the Alpha Legion's victories or strategic designs are events we don't actually wind up playing out on the tabletop (Inq28 possibly excepted) precisely because they use other tools like politics and diplomacy to accomplish outcomes without having to resort to battle. [with, of course, the obvious caveat that they remain Astartes, and fully ready to step unto the breach if their covert operations fail to properly come to fruition, or they're discovered in flagrante] [or, at the very least, the idea that the Alpha Legion you CAN see probably aren't all or most of them, and that they're doing something unexpected elsewhere while their distraction body holds your attention - which, by the time it's noticed, is alread ywell too late]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

A fair approach, Indefragable (love the name), and an appreciated one. 

 

To play along, albeit this is a more narrower approach than what I'm looking for, I particularly like your weight-of-fire analogue. Except I would say your vaunted USMC are in fact best represented by the Imperial Fists (+1BS and close combat skills where it matters, MCMAP being a joke or not), while the ruskie cold war approach to mass fire would be, oh look, Iron Warriors, who really should get an extra turn of shooting with their bolters outside of assault. 

 

It may be bias, as Marshal Rohr points out, but we're starting to see a few correlations here. And considering this whole thing is just another way of seeing identify within the legions as relative to one another, this is good. 

 

 

I don't disagree. On the surface Imperial Fists do have a lot in common with the USMC for the exact points you mention. Likewise, I found some similarities with the Death Guard and USMC based on their emphasis on infantry (everything supports the infantry) and the fact they tended do the actual marinin' (boarding actions) during the HH.

 

For me, it was more of an attitude thing. The BA "mindset" reminded me the most of my friends in the Marines for all the points I mentioned, plus a dash of Zealotry.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Another excellent write up, Ryltar. My thanks for your links. I particularly like how you approached a slightly tangential legion when it comes to strategy. Daemons we know yes, militia also, but what we haven't seen is exactly how the word bearers operate before or after all the summoning. It's what was never explained for them in the second black book, or even the Calth one. Maybe I'm just looking at something that just isn't there. Maybe Alan just wants to write "Just like any other Space Marine, just extra righteous-like." Is that it? 

 

I was also dissapointed in that the Calth book, being dedicated to only the two legions, really didn't go into the detail of how the Word Bearers used their summoning, strategically speaking, in an attempt to mitigate the Ultramarine's superior (?) conventional tactics. I do really hope that Alan and the team really go head first into this for the Thramas book. 

 

While we're at it, I'm still trying to understand the difference between the Ultramarines copying say, a maneuver from the Iron Hands, and how the Emperor's children imitate it.  

 

A tangential point, but its been bothering me. How does the mentality of Iron Warriors, Death Guard, Salamanders and Word Bearer's diverge? Can you put it in a way that justifies only two of them getting morale re-rolls in the game? And while we're at it, can anyone explain how an Iron Warrior can ignore shooting casualties, but baulk at close combat just like any other wimp legion? A mentality write up would be welcome, but I am also looking for a few witty one liners to remember regarding the topic. 

 

Edit: This line: "Particularly due to the way it operated as a separate (and decidedly less competent/well-equipped) force to the conventional Iranian Army." 

 

This is exactly what I'm looking for actually; just what does a force like Basij (our analogy to Word Bearers), have to do to beat a conventionally tactically/strategically superior force like the Iranian Army? Or is it really as simple as "tactics beat zealots, son." I must note that this force would not use guerrilla warfare, as that would be going too close to Vietnam and the privy of other legions. 

 

Churr for positive response - definitely good to have the research and writing appreciated :D 

 

 

Now as applies the Word Bearers questions you pose ... the trouble, I'm afraid, is that GW has never properly settled some elements of characterization and battlefield doctrine beyond the tired old cliches of "FOR THE EVULZ" and "Moustache Twirling Designated Villain". However, some common sense and logic (odd commodities to apply to the Warp, I know) suggest a few obvious ways that daemon-summoning might be used in the strategic situation at hand [i.e. Calth]. 

 

The advantage of being able to summon daemons as reinforcements and local force multipliers is that with enough warp power, they can effectively turn up anywhere. You can practice full-on vector-warfare, infiltration etc. by having them pop up behind enemy lines, in civilian or staging areas (thus requiring forces to be redirected away from the front line established with your conventional troops), and right on top of strategic objectives. But where this is distinct from paratroopers (or, I suppose, jump-pack equipped troops) or more conventional infiltrators, is that there's literally no interception of the daemons to be had. They simply don't exist on this plane ... up until they do, and all hell has literally started to break loose. 

 

The other strong advantage of the XVIIth's employment of daemons is that their .. well .. daemonic nature has both a corrosive effect on Imperial morale (because seriously - they're by hteir very essence uniquely terrifying things to confront, even leaving aside the fact they pop out of nowhere), and also means that at the start of the engagement Imperial doctrine hasn't caught up with how to deal with them on a tactical level. It takes awhile, for instance, for the Imperial forces on Calth to work out that it's most effective to hit them with swords and other traditional melee weapons rather than shooting at them. 

 

As applies the difference between the four legions you cite ... I think the problem is that Forgeworld made the deliberate decision toskirt round teh edges of "AND THEY SHALL KNOW NO FEAR" - only handing out constituent parts of it piecemeal and never in their whole form [i think one of the closest iterations to it yet are the rules for Custodes]. I'm not sure if there's great justifications to be had for why the four legions you cite have such different shades of enhanced-morale rules. Perhaps the IVth's speciality is with (close)ranged firefights, and they're simply not as adroit at actual melee combat - hence they're more psychologically comfortable, even when the Marine next to them's just been blasted through the chest, than they would be swinging dirks with the foe. The Death Guard may just simply be complete combat-fatalists (thus explaining hteir Fearlessness and immpunity to pinning - because their advance is implacable), while the Salamanders are similarly selflessly determined ... but not *quite* as nihilistic (hence why they have different pinning rules); and the Word Bearers are, as you say, just extra /righteous/ - and have their fanatically boosted morale represented by an extra dice involved in much of their morale. 

 

Now in reference to your question about the Basij ... the general way they made an impact (other than when going over minefields), was through the shock value of just inhumanly bearing down on the Iraqis they were facing. Continuing to march line-by-line into the teeth of the Iraqi guns, dead-eyed. It was apparently seriously rattling for the defending Iraqis - although it must be borne in mind that most of these troops were conscripts themselves and a more professionalized soldiery (such as what we can assume the Imperium has on Calth or elsewhere that the XVIIth are encountered in numbers) would presumably be less affected. 

 

Having said that, we also have a reasonable body of evidence that the Word Bearers are capable of employing relatively complex strategy and tactics [at least in those situations wherein their Designated Villian status doesn't become sufficiently overwhelming that the Evil Overlord List almost has to be invoked], so it's perhaps best to not view them *just* as the zealot-rabble referred to above. We know that the Word Bearer way of war appears to marry the aforementioned strong morale of 'piety' (to whomever, dependent upon time-period), with both asymmetric warfare (achieved through warpcraft, daemon-summoning, and the like) and the use of strongly potent elite troops as linebreakers [i.e. the Gal Vorbak]. They also back up their fervor with a certain level of ferocity and competence, meaning it would be somewhat improper to lump in XVIIth engagement doctrine with the warp cults they shepherd alongisde them. Even if they sometimes don't get the memo. 

 

The "Last of the Serrated Sun" Rite of War probably best demonstrates the Word Bearers acting as something more than frothing zealots in the manner you're alluding to ... with pretty much hte entire force turning up via Deep Strike [so vector warfare], and the mainstay of its infantry beiing comprised of Gal Vorbak [shock troops and combat monsters]. 

 

The answer then, for your impicit question of how a religiously motivated force takes on a conventional (and arguably superior) force that's better drilled or whatever, is that it doesn't limit itself to fighting on the latter's terms. What point is there in having an established and rigid battle-line of troops trained for standard combat ... when the enemy turns up from nowhere behind you as if by (literal) magic, doesn't fight as they're "supposed" to, makes a joyous habit of targeting civilian areas, constantly targets morale in any way possible (including via hte former), and basically seems uncaring about losses because it's a holy war. Alongside this, as mentioned, the XVIIth's usage of superior-motivated human auxiliaries can tie down, soften up, distract or simply overwhelm through human wave attacks more conventional opposition. 

 

"Tactics", I would be almost certain, generally beat "zealots" [and there's arguably a comparable example here of the Germans in the earlier phases of the Second World War up against Russia, wherein despite the demonstrably inferior armour of the Germans, the Russians kept losing ... up until, inter alia, the Germans started being silly and suffering hugely due to equipment failures and poor leadership]; but "zealots" WITH "tactics" (and, for that matter, superior combat competencies in some areas c.f Gal Vorbak, running around with athames etc.] are a formidable foe indeed. 

 

It also didn't probably help at Calth taht the XIIIth Legion had been so busy disseminating their own combat practices to just about everybody in the Legiones Astartes who would listen ... nothing like knowing exactly what your opponent's going to do almost before he does it to strengthen your side in a fight; whereas the sort of stuff the Word Bearers were about to pull off had basically been deliberately expunged from the Imperial military consciousness for centuries if not milleinia beofrehand. 

 

I'm not sure if that answers the questions you've posed; and I'm probably not nearly as familiar with Word Bearers fluff, novels and rules to really get inside their heads adequately; but hopefully it helps to refine perceptions and add some broad method to their rather literal madness.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well the Space Wolves fight like Vikings. Now this is actualy a bit more complex than the whole cultural stereotypes. The Norse had a specific and highly effective method of war.

 

As a raiding force that would always be outnumbered if the enemy where able to concentrate, the Norse operated in loose bands that could easily be focused or broken up as the situation demanded. If the enemy can be kept guessing as to your intentions, they can not focus against you. The Norse could spread an enemy defender's forces thin and then concentrate their own.

 

The Norse operated in far more extensive and complicated fashion than the hollywood raid. For instance you had the great heathen army of 865 in which a massive force under various commanders conquered most of England.

 

Inferno shows the Wolves operating in the same fashion with many independent commands spreading the enemy thin before concentrating where required.

 

This tactic was perfected by the English during the 100 years war in the form of the "chevauchee" in which the English would constantly raid the coast of France to keep the French army focused on trying to defend instead of being allowed to mobilise for an invasion of England.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I just want to know where "they fight at dusk and dawn and close quarters so they must be marines" line of thinking came from. The Army does that, too. We also are equipped with better close quarters gear.

 

Honestly Marshal is right in his post.

 

Now for my answer: based on FW stuff so far, the Blood Angels use the tactics of the real angelic hosts. Swift and divine strikes to obliterate those that would defy the Emperor sounds just about how they are described. To say they are based on a real world force isn't accurate.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Strategically I think the Xth Legion would play to some of the strengths that we see the modern American Army use, with their reliance on material superiority and maneuver. Having a more mechanized force than the average would allow them to concentrate and re-position force as needed, not operationally the way horse archers would stay on the move around an enemy unit but rather on a larger scale. Their emphasis on armor, cybernetic replacement, and repair capabilities mean they would likely use attrition and exhaustion as a weapon as well; keeping constant pressure on the foe and wearing down the reliability of their equipment and the fitness of their troops is an excellent strategy when your tanks are sturdier, you can repair them faster, and a large percentage of your wounded aren't actually wounded, they just need to swap their damaged arm for a new one. I imagine long battles with no interruption favor the Iron Hands, and they would plan accordingly. We already know they overstocked their legion armory, which supports this style of warfare.

 

Short version: The Iron Hands would want constant fighting with no opportunity for the enemy to rest or repair, followed by the application of overwhelming force (likely armored) to shatter the exhausted enemy. Against weaker foes they would skip straight to step 2.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Since nobody has brought it up, Imperial Japan's actions in the Second Sino-Japanese War are similar in lots of ways to several traitor legions. The zeal of the Word bearers, the massed infantry actions and willingness to use chemical and biological weapons like the Death Guard, the complete and utter disrespect for human life of the World Eaters, etc. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Had some thoughts in the wee hours of this morning about the VIIIth Legion. Now, Kais has already noted an operational tendency towards "defeat in detail"; and there's also an obvious penchant for psychological warfare taken to debilitating extremes. But in terms of fleshing out (or, in the case of the Night Lords, *flaying* out), these are still somewhat abstract concepts; and may benefit from having actual units and operational histories to draw from.

Enter the Dirlewanger Brigade. For those unaware, these are basically the literal worst war-criminals [as in, criminals who went to war, whereupon attrocity ensued] you are likely to find in the benighted annals of the Eastern Front. They were so .. almost cartoonishly brutal that even the SS themselves on a number of occasions saw fit to attempt to censure or sanction them [the military courts. etc. never stuck due to political interference, however]. As an example of just /how bad/ we're talking, there was an incident during the Wola Massacre as part of the Warsaw Uprising wherein the men of Dirlewanger stumbled upon a creche of 500 or so Polish children. Dirlewanger ordered them killed (which even members of his own unit reportedly balked somewhat at) ... through the use of bayonets and rifle-butts rather than bullets so as to conserve ammunition. An eyewitness account at the time has "blood and brain matter [flowing] in streams down the stairs". 

Anyway, the purpose of this analysis is less to shock/enlighten with historical facts than it is to engage in comparison. And when reading of the Dirlewanger, I could not help but note the perhaps surprising degree of coterminity which they had with the Night Lords in terms of the unit's formation, employment, and tactical shortcomings. 

They were put together as something of an anti-partisan force (officially, a small unit -initially at least - of "poachers"; men convicted of certain (narrowly constrained) classes of criminal offence, whose skills and 'criminal initiative' were thought to be of potential use in the relevant form of operation). With time, the strictures upon who was eligible for enlistment with Dirlewanger became virtually nonexistent - and the force grew substantially in size, attracting ever more deplorable varieties of criminal and/or psychopath along the way (like, I'm not even joking - "criminally insane" is a literal legal description of some of the men involved). It also played host to 'local' recruits from Eastern European populations for a number of months, until it was deemed that they were too "unreliable" under fire. During this period, its engagement style evolved from behind-the-lines anti-partisan duties through to a rather more pro-active approach of rollling up in a village, coralling the population into a church or other large building, setting fire to the building, and then shooting anyone who attempted to flee the flames. Exactly such an action is depicted in the Soviet masterpiece film "Come And See". It is a mark of the sort of duties they engaged and revelled in that at the point Dirlewanger Battalion had killed its 15,000th victim [the far and away overwhelming majority of which don't appear to have been partisans], it had lost only 92 men - mostly, apparently, to alcohol and friendly fire incidents. 

'Dirlewanger' DID wind up eventually being committed to more 'conventional' warfare toward the latter half of the war - although the results were overwhelmingly negative. During their main engagement with the Russians as part of Army Group Center, they lost somewhere over 50% of their men; whereas during the Warsaw Uprising they apparently suffered 315% casualties (as in, they lost several times over the number of men they went in with - which was only possible due to the steady stream of criminals who were continually able to be supplied to the unit). Toward the War's end, 'Dirlewanger' started to steadily disintegrate (even as it was officially bulked out into the status of a full Division), and you wind up with incidences like one of the "Division's" component regiments lynching its commanding officer [for reasons which, whilst never officially confirmed, may have had something to do iwth the fact hta tthe officer in questoin was the former commandant of Dachau - where a number of the criminals now in Dirlewanger had previously been imprisoned...].

Anyway. The parallels iwth the Night Lords ought be immediately obviously apparent. In both cases, we have a force deliberately constructed out of criminals and designed for anti-insurrectionary operations, who made oblique terror-tactics and seriously inhuman brutality their calling cards. Again, in both cases, we also have formations which were frightningly effective (arguably) in their particular combat role (well, they were certainly frightening, at any rate); yet which were ultimately "wasted" on conventional engagements. Additional problems of a fractious approach to discipline and internal morale coupled with cowardilness and a certain penchant towards friendly fire (of an occasionally quite deliberate nature hwen it came to offing hated erstwile superiors and the like) further stand out as similarities. We can also arguably trace the steady deterioration in 'Dirlewanger' to the demands for its swift expansion which lead to the incorporation of ever more outwardly deranged recruits - which is pretty much exactly what happened with the VIIIth Legion following the admission of Nostraman born inductees. 

When reading about the Durlewanger Battalion's activities and makeup I couldn't help but recall a certain Sevatar quote: 

""Because the Wolves kill cleanly, and we do not. They also kill quickly, and we have never done that, either. They fight, they win, and they stalk back to their ships with their tails held high. If they were ever ordered to destroy another Legion, they would do it by hurling warrior against warrior, seeking to grind their enemies down with the admirable delusions of the 'noble savage'. If we were ever ordered to assault another Legion, we would virus bomb their recruitment worlds; slaughter their serfs and slaves; poison their gene-seed repositories and spend the next dozen decades watching them die slow, humiliating deaths. Night after night, raid after raid, we'd overwhelm stragglers from their fleets and bleach their skulls to hang from our armour, until none remained. But that isn't the quick execution the Emperor needs, is it? The Wolves go for the throat. We go for the eyes. Then the tongue. Then the hands. Then the feet. Then we skin the crippled remains, and offer it up as an example to any still bearing witness. The Wolves were warriors before they became soldiers. We were murderers first, last, and always!""

Now, as it happens, there are some other units and practices which may be relevant for a proper discussion of the VIIIth. In specia, the talk about gangs turning up in the US Military. Although I think I might save more detailed analysis on this for if/when I get around to writing up something on the XVIth Legion - whom I basically perceive as operating on exactly this cultural model... 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I don't have anything profound to say, other than: this thread is the most interesting and intelligent thing I've ever read regarding plastic toy soldiers. It is- at the same time- surreal and utterly fantastic.

 

If only every discussion could be like this.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I just want to know where "they fight at dusk and dawn and close quarters so they must be marines" line of thinking came from. The Army does that, too. We also are equipped with better close quarters gear.

 

 

 

The Dusk and dawn thing is a nod to the British origins of "Old Albia" several "Ironsides" references also suggest this.

 

The British where known, right up to the first Gulf war, to "stand to" at dusk and dawn and often planned their attacks during these periods to take advantage of the dying light and the fact many other armies would change their guards at this time.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I've always thought the Iron Warriors would potentially fight like the Normans.  When you look at the Iron Warriors tactics of direct line attacks and by bombardment, mixed with probing attacks by combat units, I can't help but think of the Battle of Hastings.  When he realises that the Saxons have the high ground and his infantry alone won't win the day, William has his archers fire overhead to make the Saxon shieldwall cover themselves from the arrows coming from above.  He then has the crossbowmen fire lower to catch them with their shields still up.  Couple that with the knights probing for weakness and feigning flight to break up the shieldwall and it all seems like something Perturabo would do, only his knights would be terminators and assault squads in land raiders and spartans.

 

If the shieldwall is a fortress then drawing them out already battered and bleeding to then tear them up in combat feels very Iron Warriors, at least to me.  Making them solely WW1 style trench fighters with massive rolling bombardments just feels a bit simplistic.  Perturabo isn't a WW1 general with limited tactical knowledge, even if he is willing to sacrifice his men like one.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

 

I just want to know where "they fight at dusk and dawn and close quarters so they must be marines" line of thinking came from. The Army does that, too. We also are equipped with better close quarters gear.

 

 

The Dusk and dawn thing is a nod to the British origins of "Old Albia" several "Ironsides" references also suggest this.

 

The British where known, right up to the first Gulf war, to "stand to" at dusk and dawn and often planned their attacks during these periods to take advantage of the dying light and the fact many other armies would change their guards at this time.

But that's my point. It's the EXACT same thing in the US army. We also have a stand to period at dusk and dawn. That's why I disagree with this thread. Almost everything mentioned is practically common sense and standard across armed forces for centuries.

 

I can probably point to any legion and find a similar example from EVERY civilization that has had a major standing army and fought in wars and draw a comparison. The tactics that opened WW1 and saw mass casualties (that people are drawing to IW and and stuff) existed during the American Civil War, just with different weapons.

 

That's why culture is more important than strategies when it comes to referencing legions' inspiration.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The XVth probably won't have any clear strategic tendencies, apart from prioritizing the seizure and preservation of intelligence and records when deciding objectives in a conquest. Something that occurs to me, however, is that the XVth would likely favor fighting in extremely harsh weather. Tropical storms, dust storms, any sort of weather that hampers communication and coordination is going to favor the Thousand Sons. Any legion would tend to target enemy C&C and communication resources (if only with jamming) but a legion full of telepaths is uniquely capable of tight coordination in conditions that would normally disadvantage both sides ability to know what the hell was happening. A legion full of psykers is also uniquely capable of creating storm conditions when none are naturally present. Any environmental effects that hamper communications and reconnaissance are likely to crop up when the XVth are engaged, brought into being by the Raptora and compensated for by the Athanaeans and Corvidae. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

 

I just want to know where "they fight at dusk and dawn and close quarters so they must be marines" line of thinking came from. The Army does that, too. We also are equipped with better close quarters gear.

The Dusk and dawn thing is a nod to the British origins of "Old Albia" several "Ironsides" references also suggest this.

The British where known, right up to the first Gulf war, to "stand to" at dusk and dawn and often planned their attacks during these periods to take advantage of the dying light and the fact many other armies would change their guards at this time.

But that's my point. It's the EXACT same thing in the US army. We also have a stand to period at dusk and dawn. That's why I disagree with this thread. Almost everything mentioned is practically common sense and standard across armed forces for centuries.

I can probably point to any legion and find a similar example from EVERY civilization that has had a major standing army and fought in wars and draw a comparison. The tactics that opened WW1 and saw mass casualties (that people are drawing to IW and and stuff) existed during the American Civil War, just with different weapons.

That's why culture is more important than strategies when it comes to referencing legions' inspiration.

And yet every nation of the past and present has aspired to come up with a specific doctrine that will help it defeat all others. That's what we're doing this for. For some of us, your doctrine tells us everything we need to know about your character.

 

Show me how a man fights and all that.

 

So no, it's not all the same, and your staging point for your assumption seems to be a general namesake that served to unnoffically moniker a legion. Attacking at dusk isn't strategy, it's a strategem. And yes, stratagems tend to be shared.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

There isn't really a parallel for 'this army uses X,Y, and Z but doesn't use A, B, and C'. That would be like asking if a legion practices karate or jiu jitsu. The answer is 'they do both at varying quantities and times'. That's the big miscommunication. All armies uses everything available to complete a mission.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

There isn't really a parallel for 'this army uses X,Y, and Z but doesn't use A, B, and C'. That would be like asking if a legion practices karate or jiu jitsu. The answer is 'they do both at varying quantities and times'. That's the big miscommunication. All armies uses everything available to complete a mission.

Agreed - there may be a "theme" but ultimately, every legion comes down to utilizing the principia bellicosa. Unless you're dark angels, and utilize something altogether different cuz OG gangsta foo. Or Space Wolves, who are just unorganized Teutoberg rabble.

 

I think people are getting a little...hmmm...anal about themes. It's trying to describe a stereotype with another stereotype. There's no prize for getting the mostest bestest theme right :D

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

 

I just want to know where "they fight at dusk and dawn and close quarters so they must be marines" line of thinking came from. The Army does that, too. We also are equipped with better close quarters gear.

 

The Dusk and dawn thing is a nod to the British origins of "Old Albia" several "Ironsides" references also suggest this.

 

The British where known, right up to the first Gulf war, to "stand to" at dusk and dawn and often planned their attacks during these periods to take advantage of the dying light and the fact many other armies would change their guards at this time.

But that's my point. It's the EXACT same thing in the US army. We also have a stand to period at dusk and dawn. That's why I disagree with this thread. Almost everything mentioned is practically common sense and standard across armed forces for centuries.

 

I can probably point to any legion and find a similar example from EVERY civilization that has had a major standing army and fought in wars and draw a comparison. The tactics that opened WW1 and saw mass casualties (that people are drawing to IW and and stuff) existed during the American Civil War, just with different weapons.

 

That's why culture is more important than strategies when it comes to referencing legions' inspiration.

 

 

To be fair, the US army learned it from us Brits in WW1

Link to comment
Share on other sites

And I think you're getting hung up on the "one and only one" influence thing.  The name of the thread is "Influences" and "Doctrines".  Plural.  Yes, multiple nations will share particular idiosyncrasies, and pigeonholing Legions to a single historical military is indeed silly.  But not every military uses every doctrine ever invented, and noting which Legions use which doctrines and may be influenced by which historical army isn't a crime.  If anything, it's a good source of education for the thread's readers.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

And I think you're getting hung up on the "one and only one" influence thing.  The name of the thread is "Influences" and "Doctrines".  Plural.  Yes, multiple nations will share particular idiosyncrasies, and pigeonholing Legions to a single historical military is indeed silly.  But not every military uses every doctrine ever invented, and noting which Legions use which doctrines and may be influenced by which historical army isn't a crime.  If anything, it's a good source of education for the thread's readers.

 

This is true, look at the Napoleonic wars. Everyone used the same basic tactics, however various nations applied them in various ways.

 

For instance the British took the line formation and perfected it for use with trained and disiciplined infantry while the French developed the column formation into an offensive tactic to compensate for an army of poorly trained conscripts.

 

Therefore the British and French became unique in a war in which both British and French still used many of the same tactics, such as square formation and massed heavy cavalry.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

 

 

 

I just want to know where "they fight at dusk and dawn and close quarters so they must be marines" line of thinking came from. The Army does that, too. We also are equipped with better close quarters gear.

 

The Dusk and dawn thing is a nod to the British origins of "Old Albia" several "Ironsides" references also suggest this.

 

The British where known, right up to the first Gulf war, to "stand to" at dusk and dawn and often planned their attacks during these periods to take advantage of the dying light and the fact many other armies would change their guards at this time.

But that's my point. It's the EXACT same thing in the US army. We also have a stand to period at dusk and dawn. That's why I disagree with this thread. Almost everything mentioned is practically common sense and standard across armed forces for centuries.

 

I can probably point to any legion and find a similar example from EVERY civilization that has had a major standing army and fought in wars and draw a comparison. The tactics that opened WW1 and saw mass casualties (that people are drawing to IW and and stuff) existed during the American Civil War, just with different weapons.

 

That's why culture is more important than strategies when it comes to referencing legions' inspiration.

To be fair, the US army learned it from us Brits in WW1

Bwahahahahahahaha

 

Please tell me you're not serious. I will put aside my subjectivity to lay on some objective factual evidence here lol

 

General Longstreet, second in command of the Confederate Army (understand I am a Yankee and had family fight on the Yankee side) kept a long journal and record of defensive trench warfare strategy to use. He become second in charge after Stonewall Jackson took it like a man, and advised General Lee against an aggressive strategy.

 

General Longstreet's ideas of trench warfare were innovative for the time and would lead toward strategy used in WWI, however, trenches themselves had been used since Roman times.

 

British military can likely take credit for counter battery fire that they became synonymous for, yet it was a tactic as old as the Byzantines and the Turks.

 

I don't want to sound like this is an attack, but when you say we picked up up from the British, it's purely, objectively false. We got your language and legal system, but that's where we draw the line :D last time we got behind a British strategy, Operation Market Garden happened.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.

  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

By using this site, you agree to our Terms of Use.